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very self-respecting finance minister has to pay lip service to the dictum that the sector 
itself should pay for any problem bank. But when the problem bank turns out to be a 
home bank, the tune changes immediately and excuses are quickly found why in this 
particular case some infusion of public money is needed. The official justification is usually 
that the bank has only a liquidity problem and that markets just fail to recognise that it is 
really solvent in the long run.  In reality, there are often close ties between the holders of the 
bank’s equity and debt and the national political class. 
Moreover,  the  dream  of  resolving  banks  without  resort  to  public  money  becomes  a 
nightmare in the event of a systemic crisis. Experience has shown that a systemic crisis can 
go from bad to worse if the public sector refuses to intervene.   
Hence, it does not make sense to judge the plans for the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
on how it would have dealt with the current crisis. The purpose of the SRM would be to 
create a system under which individual banks could be resolved without creating problems 
for the payments systems, the availability of credit or, more in general, problems of systemic 
stability. The existing national resolution procedures (to the extent that they existed at all) 
were in many cases inadequate for this task. 
Time inconsistency 
The key economic problem is actually not how to protect the public purse, but how to create 
a situation in which bank managers and their investors do not count on public support ex 
ante, because this expectation of public support distorts the cost of capital.  
Ex post, i.e. once a crisis has materialised, the rescue of some investors is often unavoidable to 
limit contagion or to minimise bankruptcy costs. 
A hands-off policy to bank insolvency is thus not time consistent! 
Time inconsistency and credibility 
On paper, the EU has imposed upon itself (and the national authorities) very strict rules 
under which a bank can receive any public support, unless some of its creditors have been 
‘bailed in’. In principle, these the rules will apply from 2016 onwards. 
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But are these strict ‘bail-in’ rules credible? The EU Directive regulating this aspect contains a 
number of exceptions. The most important one allows national authorities to avoid a bail-in if 
‘systemic stability’ is in danger.  
This leads to the question: Who is likely to use this loophole? The track record suggests that 
this may well be the one country that has insisted the most on the need to protect the public 
purse, namely Germany, where even junior, subordinated debt was fully paid during the 
financial crisis and no private investor in bank debt was ever bailed in. Moreover, in 2008-09, 
Germany had the second-highest ratio of financial support to the banking system relative to 
GDP among all countries in the EU. 
How to overcome the time-inconsistency problem? 
When  economists  diagnose  a  ‘time-inconsistency’  problem,  they  usually  recommend 
delegating decision-making authority to an independent agency. This was the prescription 
when inflation had to be tamed. Central banks were made independent and given only one 
task: preserve price stability. This remedy was applied in particular to the ECB, which has 
been  quite  successful  in  maintaining  price  stability  (but  less  successful  in  maintaining 
financial stability). 
When  the  euro  was  created,  it  was  generally  agreed  that  those  countries  with  the  least-
independent central banks and the worst inflation track records would gain the most from 
delegating  monetary  policy  to  an  independent  ECB.  Similarly,  one  could  argue  that  the 
countries  likely to  gain  the  most  from  delegating  bank  resolution  to  an  independent  EU 
agency  should  be  those  with  the  lowest  cost  of  public  funds  (and  hence  those  with  the 
strongest temptation to save banks ex post) and the countries with the closest links between 
the banking sector and the political class. 
Cui bono?  
The  negotiating  positions  over  the  last  months  were  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
countries under financial stress needed the SRM and that Germany made a big concession by 
agreeing  on  a  common  fund  (SRF)  and  a  common  decision-making  board.  However,  in 
reality, the time-inconsistency problem suggests that the long-run benefits might be higher 
for  Germany  than  for  countries  with  weak  public  finances.  Germany  might  get  a  more 
efficient banking system if it agrees to ‘bind its own hands’. 
A  second  argument  often  used  in  Germany  (and  other  creditor  countries)  is  that  the 
resources collected from German banks might be used primarily to bail out banks in the 
periphery. But one should keep in mind that a restructuring fund like the SRF will not bail 
out the bankers or the equity holders, but investors in the other assets of the bank. Many of 
these investors might actually be German, given that the country is running such a large 
current account surplus. 
The popular perception that the periphery has the most to gain from the establishment of a 
unified resolution regime that really limits bail out in a credible way might have gotten it 
backwards. In reality, Germany and other surplus countries have a bigger interest in tying 
the hands of their national resolution authorities, which have a tendency to be too generous.  